However, the essence of choice is supposed to have an outer determination, so the structure of this concept must be examined as a substantial determination, a concrete direction of subjectobject and subject -subject interaction.
The question about the structure of choice is also of great theoretical and practical importance.
We begin to understand the essence of choice better, while extending our knowledge in the sphere of the choice structure. In philosophical literature the given question was explored insufficiently, but some investigators both Russian and foreign touched upon it indirectly (V. Vindelband, K.A.
Novikov, E.F. Birn). However, doing justice to the supporters of a dialectical-materialistic conception, who admit objective existence and essence as well as phenomenon and examine them in a close correlation with each other, one cannot but mention that phenomenon is not identical with its essence. This misrepresentation is conditioned by the difference between essence and phenomenon, between essence and existence.
Phenomenon is greater than essence as it includes not only the disclosure of essential connections, but also possible chance relationships, individual characteristics and others. In comparison with essence it is more mobile and dynamic. The analysis of the intentional structure of consciousness is realized in a reflexive way. So, phenomenology distinguishes a natural aim and a proper phenomenological one. In the world of daily thinking our life remains beyond any experience of the intentional direction of consciousness towards objects. Thanks to phenomenological reduction it is possible to ascend to the intentional structure of consciousness. Reduction allows becoming free from the natural aim of consciousness, which is directed towards cognizing outer objects.
Reduction lets consciousness turn to investigating
proper activities on objects' constructing.
The intentional analysis marks out an object, making definite sense, and on the other hand, changing phenomenon's ways, changing consciousness's modi. Husserl calls these mutually additional aspects of intentionality "noesis" and "noema", the essence and phenomenon. Noesis is a modus of intentional consciousness; noema is its subject sense, an objective correlate. Thus, phenomenological reduction allows describing noetic and noematic structures of consciousness.
Husserl distinguished three types of reduction.
They are psychological, ideatic and transcendental types.
Analyzing choice as a phenomenon, the author of the paper, supposes that the marked out models of ordinary, semantic and existential choices are neither more or less than the levels of phenomenological reduction. Is that really so?
Psychological reduction is directed towards the pure data of psychic experience. It discovers the field to pure psychic givenness. At that stage general essential qualities of this field are described by the experience of uninterrupted intentional explications and a subject remains still within the experience. Correlating with the essence of an ordinary choice, where it is to determine an optimal way of realizing the activity, directed towards achieving a result, we see that the subject's task is to determine which of alternatives conforms to the given criterion most and why it is more preferable than others.
We meet a more complicated variety of choice when any criteria for comparing alternatives are not given initially and a man has to construct them independently, for example, a choice of a profession or a spouse. As a matter of fact, the subject faces the task to determine the sense of each alternative, placing it in one's own vital world. It is a semantic choice. It conforms to essence of ideatic reduction, which leads to the necessity of essential discretion of phenomena;
consciousness's subjects are analyzed from the point of view of their essential characteristics.
As Husserl wrote, this type of reduction is in the discretion of pure generalities, correlated with an infinite extent of freely thinkable possibilities as exceptionally possible facts, which are ordered by a norm of thinking as possible facts. These pure generalities are pure self-evidences in their essence. In order to discover the pure generalities of a phenomenological object, the method of "free variations in fantasy" is used, and thanks to it different sides of the phenomenological object vary absolutely arbitrarily, discovering the invariant, maintaining in all variants. It comes into being as a result of constant self-coincidences of variants. The semantic invariant that is general to all variants is the same for any possible variation "in general".
The method of "free variations in fantasy"
concerns not only a phenomenological object, but also phenomenological subjectivity. As in the case with a phenomenological object, the ego describes the invariant of phenomenological subjectivity as an invariant of the "pure I" by varying possible variants consecutively. The method of free variation originally concerns only invariants of the ego proper, but when the question about understanding 'the other' and inter-subjectivity arises, then by analogy with my "ego", "the other" will have the same system of invariants.
Thus, the result of ideatic reduction can be any possible (conceivable) world with necessary attaching to being significant. In this connection
Husserl explains that "after introducing extended reduction, the reduction to the phenomenological pure inter-subjectivity, the universal Apriori appears for subjects' communities, reduced to their inner phenomenological and pure unity" (Husserl, 1909, 124) . The necessity of transcendental problems and, accordingly, of transition to transcendentally phenomenological reduction is explained by the being of subjectivity, "I". In this case the question is about subjectivity, constructing universal objectivity of the world. Since consciousness's subjectivity belongs to the real world, universal objectivity both in its reality and ideality appears as the definite world, provided with definite sense.
As far as a transcendental purpose becomes free from any forms of conceivable and real worlds in motion of its own expansion, phenomenology creates its fundamental concepts from itself, including the phenomenon of choice.
Thus, analyzing a choice category as a phenomenon, it should be noted that models of ordinary, semantic and existential choices kept direction the system will develop; whether it will be unregulated or it will move up to a new, higher level of regulating and organizing. In the second case the system acquires a dissipated structure, which needs more energy for its maintenance than simpler structures replaced by it produce (Toffler, Prigozhin, Stengers, 1986, 30 (Abramov, 2002, 15) .
In a conceptual sense the basis of the problem solution of choice's action mechanisms is a synergetic paradigm, characterized by nonlinearity, irreversibility, instability, inequality.
Together with the bifurcation mechanism these four categories form a new basic model of "selforganization processes, roughly fair to all three levels of organizing the material world -a lifeless substance, a live matter and a society" (Moiseev, 1998, p.72 ).
Thus, even if an integral logic of choice, i.e. its structure, uniting "outer" and "inner" logics, is possible, it is nonlineal logic. It should take into account the "human factor", which can be expressed namely in spontaneous and unpredictable actions, in its dependence on circumstances that seem inessential at first sight. It must explain choice as an action that is irreversible and crucial at the same time.
As applied to understanding the essence and structure of choice, synergetics is significant Processes of such a type of connection have a purely causative character of regulating the system according to its parameters changing. The system itself does not have any "intentions", but as a result of purely mechanistic correlations of its parts it is capable of self-regulating. So, thanks to the conception of a negative reverse connection, behavior called "purposeful" and "expedient "
acquires causative-deterministic explanation in the spirit of mechanistic rationalism (Viner,1983, 5-28) . in society, i.e. its conduct becomes unpredictable (Laslo, 1991, pp.18-19) . The striking example of such development is the situation in Russia in the post-Soviet period.
Society's conduct in this situation will be unpredictable since at the bifurcation point unstable processes can go in any direction, and this "choice" is not determined, dependent on casual outer and inner factors. In point of fact, bifurcation is a mathematical way of "transition from quantitative changes to qualitative ones", what is one of the system's displays. "Quality's change under the influence of quantitative changes may happen only when an object has a systematic character" (Kuznetsov, 1996, 20) . It is more difficult to describe such a delicate structure of choice, where the following three stages are marked out: -Immersing into chaos (the origin of a choice situation).
-Being in chaos (the moment, when from a great number of alternatives the necessary one is being chosen, i.e. the moment of a proper choice).
-Going out of chaos (the moment, when the choice has been made, but is not realized yet, the ways to realize it are being planned) (selforganization).
Using such a method of approach, we inevitably come across the urgency of infinite 
Conclusion
Thus, analyzing the category of choice as a phenomenon, it should be noted that models of ordinary, semantic and existential choices kept in it in a reduced form, whose essence becomes apparent in the process of subject's activity, throw light on the inner nature of the given phenomenon and equal electivity of its displays most completely, and also allow determining new semantic meanings of an ideal model of choice as a whole.
As for the structure of choice, at present it is hardly possible to deduce a strict "formula", disclosing the mechanism of a choice action.
Nevertheless we can mark out three stages:
-Immersing into chaos (the origin of a choice situation).
-Going out of chaos (the moment, when the choice has been made, but is not realized yet, its realization's ways are being planned) (selforganization).
This is the mechanism of a choice's realization as a phenomenon, given in general outlines, from the views of phenomenology and synergetics.
